New Directions in Philosophy of Medicine by Stegenga, Jacob et al.
343
343
 Introduction 
 As we have seen from the previous chapters, philosophy of medicine is a 
dynamic area of research, raising, and seeking to answer, a plethora of met-
aphysical, practical, and moral questions in medicine. Such questions are of 
importance not just for their intrinsic philosophical interest, but also because 
they have implications for medical research, practice, and policy. Recent work 
in philosophy of medicine has addressed such questions as the appropriate evi-
dence base for medicine, the nature and defi nition of “health” and of “disease,” 
and the relative contributions of scientifi c research and patients’ experiences to 
an understanding of medical questions. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to describe what we see as several important new 
directions for philosophy of medicine. This recent work (i) takes existing discus-
sions in important and promising new directions, (ii) identifi es areas that have 
not received suﬃ  cient and deserved att ention to date, and/ or (iii) brings together 
philosophy of medicine with other areas of philosophy (including bioethics, phi-
losophy of psychiatry, and social epistemology). To this end, the next part focuses 
on what we call the “epistemological turn” in recent work in the philosophy of 
medicine; the third part addresses new developments in medical research that 
raise interesting questions for philosophy of medicine; the fourth part is a discus-
sion of philosophical issues within the practice of diagnosis; the fi fth part focuses 
on the recent developments in psychiatric classifi cation and scientifi c and ethical 
issues therein, and the fi nal part focuses on the objectivity of medical research. 
 The Epistemological Turn 
 Some of the best scholarship in philosophy of medicine in the past two dec-
ades has been about the epistemology of medical research. This is a welcome 
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development after a period in which much good work in philosophy of medi-
cine was focused on conceptual topics, most notably analyses of health and dis-
ease, or normative topics, especially ethical issues that arise in medical practice. 
Philosophers such as John Worrall, Nancy Cartwright, Alex Broadbent, Kirstin 
Borgerson, Phyllis Illari, and Jeremy Howick have been at the forefront of this 
turn to epistemology in the philosophy of medicine. Two of the most prominent 
topics in the epistemological turn were the epistemic merits of randomized con-
trolled trials (RCTs) and the role of mechanisms in grounding various sorts of 
causal claims. Here we describe four ways in which present and future work 
in the philosophy of medicine has been and will continue to develop this turn 
toward epistemology. 
 Some of the central epistemological debates in philosophy of medicine 
have been about the epistemic status of RCTs and systematic reviews. RCTs 
are considered to be one of the pillars of the evidence- based medicine (EBM) 
movement, and systematic reviews are also placed at the top of EBM evidence 
hierarchies. However, both have recently been the targets of philosophical criti-
cism (Worrall,  2002 ,  2007 ; Borgerson,  2009 ; Stegenga,  2011 ). Other philosophers 
suggest that knowledge of mechanisms can aid in making causal inferences, 
while theoreticians in the EBM movement tend to hold that reasoning from 
mechanisms is too often unreliable (Howick,  2011a ; Russo and Williamson, 
 2007 ). These EBM methodological principles and their associated philosophical 
critiques have tended to articulate epistemological merits and vices at a rather 
coarse grain: is randomization necessary to support reliably causal hypotheses 
in medicine? Is meta- analysis the platinum standard of evidence? Is knowledge 
of mechanisms necessary to infer causation or to warrant extrapolation? Such 
questions could be fruitfully addressed at a fi ner grain. 
 An example of a fi ne- grained approach to methodology is the assessment of 
particular details of RCTs rather than arguing about the merits of randomiza-
tion generally. Likewise, McClimans ( 2013 ) investigates the various measure-
ment instruments employed in RCTs, thereby unpacking details about RCTs 
left unanalyzed when the merits of RCTs simpliciter are debated. Similarly, 
rather than argue about the merits of meta- analysis tout court, as Stegenga 
( 2011 ) does, one could articulate the ways in which meta- analyses can be bett er 
or worse. Or, to take another example, rather than arguing whether knowl-
edge of mechanisms is necessary for causal inferences in medicine, one could 
att empt to formulate precisely how mechanisms can aid in causal inferences 
and extrapolation from experimental populations to target populations. Steel 
( 2007 ), for example, argues that “comparative process tracing” of mechanisms 
can aid in extrapolating causal knowledge. 
 Another example of fi ne- grained approaches in the epistemological turn is 
evidence hierarchies. Arguments for and against the standard evidence hier-
archies have recently been articulated (Howick,  2011b ; Stegenga,  2014 ). But 
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Osimani ( forthcoming ) argues that diﬀ erent kinds of hypotheses, such as 
hypotheses about harms of medical interventions, require diﬀ erent kinds of 
evidence compared to hypotheses about benefi ts of medical interventions; thus, 
general arguments about the justifi cation of EBM evidence hierarchies might 
be too coarse- grained. Indeed, changing the metaphor, Bluhm ( 2005 ) argues 
that evidence hierarchies should be replaced by evidence networks, to take into 
account the rich information that various types of studies in clinical research 
can provide. One fi nal example is the ways in which recent trial designs att empt 
to take into account some of the complexities of clinical practice. In short, a 
fi ne- grained analysis of the methodological details of medical research is on the 
forefront of the epistemological turn in philosophy of medicine. 
 The second aspect of the epistemological turn in philosophy of medicine 
involves articulating the intersection between social, ethical, and methodologi-
cal aspects of medical research. An example of such a concern of present (and 
future) work in philosophy of medicine is to articulate the methodological and 
social conditions under which many of the problems of medical research are 
possible. For example (Jukola,  2015 ; see also the end of this chapter), argues that 
a compelling way to understand the shortcomings of meta- analysis requires 
not just an examination of the methodological details of meta- analysis, but also 
an examination of the social context in which this technique is employed. As 
another example, De Melo- Martin and Intemann ( 2011 ) argue for a feminist 
approach to understanding problems with contemporary biomedical research. 
A diﬀ erent sort of interest regarding the relationship between social, ethical, 
and methodological aspects of medical research investigates the infl uence 
that social or ethical values can have on the production and interpretation of 
evidence. In a widely discussed paper, Douglas ( 2000 ) argues for the central 
role of values in scientifi c reasoning, and this thesis is especially prominent in 
medical research. For example, Kennedy ( 2013 ) argues that ethics and evidence 
are “intertwined” in the practice of diﬀ erential diagnosis. As another example, 
Tekin ( 2014 ) argues that psychiatric nosology is “at the crossroads of science 
and ethics.” 
 In the past decade, there have been many proclamations of a thesis that one 
could call “medical nihilism.” Various versions of medical nihilism emphasize 
the lack of reproducibility of many high- profi le research fi ndings in medicine, 
the nefarious activities of medical scientists associated with pharmaceutical 
companies, and perhaps most troubling, the low eﬀ ectiveness of the vast major-
ity of recent pharmaceuticals. Contributors to this literature include prominent 
physicians, epidemiologists, and journalists. Recent examples include books 
by Marcia Angell ( 2004 ), Moynihan and Cassels ( 2005 ), Carl Elliott  ( 2010 ), Ben 
Goldacre ( 2012 ), and Peter Gøtz sche ( 2013 ), and articles by epidemiologists 
such as John Ioannidis, Lisa Bero, Peter Jüni, and Jan Vandenbroucke. A third 
task for present philosophy of medicine in the epistemological turn is to assess 
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just how deep and troubling the thesis of medical nihilism is. Stegenga ( forth-
coming ), for example, argues that medical nihilism is a compelling thesis for 
much of recent medicine. 
 Medical nihilism is motivated, in part, by noting problems with the socio-
political nexus in which medical research takes place. A fourth set of concerns 
for present and future philosophy of medicine in the epistemological turn is to 
address questions such as: How should medical research be modulated given 
the recent work on epistemology of such research? Who should pay for medi-
cal research? What kinds of projects should be prioritized by funders of medi-
cal research? Should the results and products of medical research be protected 
by intellectual property laws? As an example of recent work in this domain, 
Brown (2008) argues that medical research should be socialized and the results 
of medical research should not be protected by patent laws. A broadly similar 
proposal is suggested by Reiss ( 2010 ). The epistemological turn has uncovered 
numerous epistemological problems with contemporary medical research, and 
such problems call for normative guidance. 
 In what follows, we discuss some of these elements of the epistemological 
turn in the philosophy of medicine in more detail, including issues related to 
evidence hierarchies, extrapolation, diagnosis, the construction of psychiatric 
categories, and the pursuit of objectivity in medical research. 
 Beyond RCTs and Meta- analyses 
 In addition to these recent developments in philosophy of medicine, there are 
a number of developments in medical research itself that should be of interest 
to philosophers. As noted earlier, much of the work being done on philosophi-
cal questions raised by clinical research has examined RCTs. This is in large 
part due to the infl uence of EBM and, in particular, to its “hierarchy of evi-
dence,” which stipulates that the best quality evidence comes from RCTs and 
systematic reviews of RCTs. The rationale behind the hierarchy of evidence is 
that designs higher on the hierarchy have greater internal validity and more 
precision in their estimates of outcomes than those lower on the hierarchy. 
Yet, as critics of EBM have pointed out, this precision may come at the cost 
of generalizability. First, because many RCTs have strict inclusion and exclu-
sion criteria, many of the patients who might be treated with a drug in clinical 
practice would not have qualifi ed for participation in the trial that tested that 
drug. Second, because RCTs compare average outcomes in the treatment and 
the control groups for a study, they give litt le information about diﬀ erences 
in outcomes among the patients in the study. Meta- analyses exacerbate this 
problem, since they usually average the (average) results across studies to get a 
more precise estimate of outcomes. 
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 While EBM itself has not tended to acknowledge the gravity of these prob-
lems, there have been a number of recent trends in medical research that have 
att empted to address the issue of variable treatment outcomes, either by con-
ducting research in a sett ing that more closely resembles clinical practice or 
by studying outcomes specifi cally in groups of patients who have a particular 
demographic or physiological characteristic. This section surveys several of 
these trends and outlines their potential interest for philosophers of medicine. 
 Research Generalizability and Clinical Care 
 RCTs with strict inclusion and exclusion criteria tend to be so- called explana-
tory trials, which aim to provide evidence that an intervention causes an out-
come of interest by showing that, in carefully controlled, “ideal” conditions, 
a therapeutic intervention provides bett er outcomes than a placebo control 
(Thorpe et al.,  2009 ). The strength of these trials is that they are considered 
to provide evidence that the experimental intervention causes the outcomes(s) 
being measured; this is because the trial is designed to ensure that, as far as 
possible, the only diﬀ erence between the treatment and the control groups is 
that the treatment group receives the intervention being tested. An eﬃ  cient 
way to show diﬀ erences between study groups is to minimize variability  within 
groups. To achieve this, explanatory studies have strict inclusion and exclusion 
criteria; for example, limiting eligibility to a narrow age range and enrolling 
only patients with no comorbid conditions, who are not taking concomitant 
medications. As a result of these decisions about study eligibility, subjects who 
qualify for participation in explanatory trials are diﬀ erent in important respects 
from typical patients who are treated in clinical practice. It is therefore not clear 
how well causal relationships between treatment and outcome observed in sub-
jects enrolled in explanatory studies might hold up in other kinds of patients. 
 Because of this, greater att ention is now being paid to research that is more 
closely integrated with clinical practice. In a 2007 workshop report, the US 
Institute of Medicine called for the development of a “learning healthcare sys-
tem,” defi ned as a system of healthcare “in which knowledge generation is so 
embedded into the core of the practice of medicine that it is a natural outgrowth 
and product of the healthcare delivery process and leads to continual improve-
ment in care.” Although the workshop addressed a broad range of issues, one 
key point made was that RCTs are not suﬃ  cient to inform clinical practice, in 
part because of the concerns about generalizability noted earlier. 
 Learning healthcare systems would conduct a variety of kinds of research, 
including long- term observational studies and studies using administrative 
databases and patient records. They would still conduct RCTs, but these stud-
ies would tend to be pragmatic rather than explanatory; that is, they would be 
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designed to refl ect the conditions in which an intervention is used in practice, 
rather than an idealized test environment. Pragmatic trials, for example, tend to 
enroll a broader range of patients than explanatory trials, as well as to involve 
physicians working in a wider variety of care sett ings. They may also, unlike 
explanatory trials, allow variability in treatment protocol. 
 While some studies that take a more pragmatic approach to research design 
are RCTs, others may examine outcomes in the context of actual clinical prac-
tice, for example, examining patient records or using nonrandomized designs 
to follow patients who receive an intervention of interest. Thorpe et al. ( 2009 ) 
categorize these as pragmatic features; they have developed a tool that char-
acterizes study designs along a number of dimensions to determine whether 
they are more explanatory or more pragmatic in design, or even whether those 
studies are RCTs. 
 This spectrum of research designs raises interesting epistemological and eth-
ical questions for philosophers of medicine. For example, work in research eth-
ics has traditionally taken it to be the case that a sharp distinction can be made 
between research and clinical practice, but this can no longer be assumed. For 
example, according to Thorpe et al. ( 2009 ), one pragmatic feature a study could 
have is tracking patient outcomes over the long term using healthcare records 
(which is something generally done in the context of clinical practice) rather 
than using the kind of formal follow- up that is the norm in clinical research. 
Philosophers of medicine may also be interested in elucidating the strengths 
and weaknesses of diﬀ erent kinds of studies, building on the body of work that 
examines the epistemology of EBM. Work in this area will also have implica-
tions for research ethics, as it challenges the traditional research/ practice dis-
tinction that is the foundation of the Belmont Report (United States, 1978; see 
also Largent et al.,  2011 ; Kass et al., 2012). 
 Tracking Outcomes within Speciﬁ c Patient Groups 
 A number of other developments in clinical research are related to the second 
problem identifi ed with respect to RCTs, that is, the fact that RCTs tend to look 
only at average outcomes in the treatment and in the control groups. We briefl y 
survey three of these developments here: gender medicine, “basket trials,” 
and the US National Institutes of Mental Health’s Research Domain Criteria 
(RDoC). These examples come from diﬀ erent areas of medicine and also diﬀ er 
in the kind of characteristics they use to “sort” patients into relevantly simi-
lar groups. While these examples are not concerned directly with treatment 
outcomes, they do aim ultimately to improve health interventions by ensuring 
that they target only groups of patients in which there is a higher- than- average 
chance of benefi t. One reason for this broad development in clinical research is 
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that most new drugs being developed have very low treatment eﬀ ects (a prob-
lem that has contributed to the medical nihilism mentioned earlier); the hope is 
that particular groups of patients might experience bett er results. 
 Gender medicine (also known as gender- specifi c medicine) has developed in 
order to understand bett er the eﬀ ects of sex and gender diﬀ erences on health.  1  
This includes “prevention, clinical signs, therapeutic approach, prognosis, psy-
chological and social impact” (Baggio et al.,  2013 ). As with anything that focuses 
on diﬀ erences between women and men, gender medicine includes not only bio-
logical dimensions but also social and political dimensions. Traditionally, clini-
cal research has been conducted mainly on men, on the grounds that women’s 
hormone cycles present a serious confounding factor that complicates the inter-
pretation of data. In 1982, Rebecca Dresser pointed out that medical research 
was conducted almost entirely on white men, and she argued that the near 
exclusion of other demographic groups was both ethically and epistemologi-
cally problematic. With regard to women in particular, she noted that in addi-
tion to the resulting lack of knowledge of diseases that aﬀ ect only women (e.g., 
uterine cancer), women and men can have physiological diﬀ erences that infl u-
ence both the manifestations of disease and response to treatment. Currently, 
in the United States, the NIH requires studies to enroll participants from diﬀ er-
ent demographic groups, so that study samples are more representative of the 
population. There is disagreement, however, about the epistemological value 
of analyzing treatment outcomes in diﬀ erent subgroups of participants in an 
RCT; gender medicine takes a clear stance on this issue by recommending that 
potential outcome diﬀ erences between women and men be examined. 
 Another att empt to develop more clinically useful groupings of patients 
comes from oncology research. “Basket trials” are designed to provide quick 
information about the eﬃ  cacy of drugs in groups of patients who have a spe-
cifi c, usually rare, mutation— regardless of the histology of the tumors. These 
studies build on evidence that, even in trials of therapies that do not appear 
to be eﬀ ective in treating cancer, a small number of patients may respond to 
the therapy, sometimes quite dramatically. These patients were found to have 
similar mutations, suggesting that new treatments may target specifi c genetic 
markers (Lynch et al.,  2004 ). Trials that utilize these fi ndings enroll patients 
who have a particular mutation, and then group patients with the same kind of 
cancer into smaller “baskets” within the bigger trial. In some cases treatments 
are eﬀ ective across diﬀ erent cancer types, although in others the picture is 
more complicated. For example, vemurfenib has been approved for treatment 
of melanoma, in which a mutation called  BRAF V600E is fairly common. The 
drug is not eﬀ ective in treating colorectal cancer associated with this mutation, 
but may be eﬀ ective for metastatic papillary thyroid cancer (Willyard,  2013 ). 
More recently, it has been suggested that, based on the molecular mechanisms 
involved, vemurfenib may be eﬀ ective for treatment of colorectal cancer when 
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used as part of a combination therapy (Prahallad et al.,  2012 ). This work sug-
gests that understanding the relationship between tumor type and mutation 
type may be important. Although advocates believe that basket trials have the 
promise to revolutionize cancer treatment, it should be noted that the available 
evidence is still very scant. 
 The most radical att empt to fi nd new ways of grouping patients is the RDoC 
project, which aims to replace current, symptom- based diagnostic categories— 
and, by extension, prognostic and treatment categories— with new diagnostic 
groups that are rooted in genetics, behavioral sciences, and, especially, neuro-
science.  2  The RDoC framework consists of a matrix, in which the rows represent 
constructs that are “the fundamental unit of analysis” in the National Institutes 
of Mental Health (NIMH) framework and which describe specifi c dimensions 
of psychological functioning, such as reward learning, cognitive performance 
monitoring, and att achment formation and maintenance. The columns of the 
matrix refl ect units or levels of analysis (e.g., genes, cells, neural circuits, self- 
reports) and the cells of the matrix contain information about which specifi c 
genes (etc.) have been shown to be relevant to the construct. The NIMH notes 
explicitly that this may entail that patients with diﬀ erent diagnoses (accord-
ing to the current system), but similar functional impairments related to a con-
struct, may end up qualifying for the same research study. Similarly, using 
constructs as the basic categorization may entail that among patients with the 
same diagnosis, only some will be eligible for a study that examines a particular 
construct. 
 The NIMH notes that the RDoC project is still in its preliminary stages, 
and very much open to revision (including the possible addition of new con-
structs). It also notes that the true test of the framework as a whole and of 
particular constructs is their clinical usefulness: “the critical test is how well 
the new molecular and neurobiological parameters predict prognosis and 
treatment” (Insel et al.,  2010 ). At the same time, it is clear that the NIMH is 
bett ing that the biological approach is the best way to achieve progress in 
psychiatry and to overcome the limitations of the current symptom- based 
approach. “If we assume that the clinical syndromes based on subjective 
symptoms are unique and unitary disorders, we undercut the power of biol-
ogy to identify illnesses linked to pathophysiology and we limit the devel-
opment of more specifi c treatments” (National Institutes of Mental Health, 
RDoC website). 
 Initiatives like RDoC, basket trials, and gender medicine raise philosophi-
cally interesting questions about the establishment of prognostic (and, par-
ticularly in the case of RDoC, of diagnostic) groups. For example, they may 
inform the debates in philosophy of medicine about the role of knowledge 
of mechanisms in clinical research and in patient care, which may ideally 
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take the “fi ne- grained” approach to medical epistemology we have described 
earlier. 
 Diagnosis 
 Compared with discussions of clinical research on treatments, which has also 
been the primary focus of the previous sections of this chapter, there is less 
philosophical work on diagnosis. This represents a signifi cant research gap, as 
diagnosis is of pivotal importance in medical practice, and as such is the start-
ing point of the clinical encounter. Before treatment or prognostic evaluation 
of a patient can begin, there must be at least a working diagnosis. If a clinician 
does not begin the clinical encounter by working to obtain an accurate diag-
nosis, then subsequent treatments prescribed for the patient are likely to fail, 
and prognoses to be inaccurate. In light of the important role of diagnosis in 
medical practice, it might seem somewhat surprising that the philosophy of 
medicine literature on diagnosis is sparse. A recent survey, for example, found 
that of the 627 articles published over a 10- year span in the two main philos-
ophy of medicine journals,  Journal of Medicine and Philosophy and  Theoretical 
Medicine and Bioethics , only 4 included a discussion of diagnosis (Stempsey, 
 2008 ). Addressing this research gap is another new area in which philosophers 
of medicine are beginning to work. There are many issues in diagnosis and 
diagnostics that have as yet to benefi t from philosophical att ention. In the next 
section, we note a few of them and then examine one in detail: the question of 
how to evaluate the medical worth of a diagnostic test. 
 Philosophical Questions in Diagnostic Practice 
 Philosophical questions in diagnostic practice can be roughly divided between 
those that concern diagnostic  reasoning and those that concern  diagnostics (tests 
and procedures that are used in the process of medical diagnosis). In the fi rst 
category, there are questions of whether there is a logic of diagnosis, and if so, 
whether this logic is computable, and whether the diagnostic reasoning process 
is generalizable. 
 In the second category, which we examine more closely here, the questions 
concern the diagnostic tests and procedures themselves, and how they should 
be evaluated. In the fi rst instance, diagnostic tests need to be evaluated for 
accuracy. However, even once a diagnostic test is determined to be relatively 
accurate, the question of whether it is valuable remains. In order to answer this 
question, one needs at least a working theory of what counts as valuable in the 
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medical context. Thus the process of determining the medical worth of a diag-
nostic test has both epistemic and ethical components. 
 Diagnostic Accuracy and Patient Outcomes 
 Before we can determine whether a diagnostic test is valuable, we must fi rst 
determine whether the test is accurate. Currently, there is discussion in the 
medical literature  3  about the best way to determine diagnostic accuracy. While, 
as we have seen, RCTs are considered by the EBM movement to be the gold 
standard for determining both  treatment and  prevention eﬃ  cacy, until recently 
they have not been used to determine test accuracy. However, RCTs are now 
being used, for example, to determine whether one diagnostic test is more 
accurate (i.e., more sensitive and specifi c) than another. This can be done, for 
instance, to test the comparative accuracy of a new, or lesser used, diagnostic 
test against the currently accepted clinical reference standard (the test that is 
deemed to be the most reliable available test for diagnosing a given condition).  4  
For example, one might be interested in determining the comparative accuracy 
of duplex ultrasonography versus angiography (the clinical reference standard) 
for diagnosing arterial stenosis in patients presenting with cervical bruit. As 
the sensitivity and specifi city of diagnostic tests such as these can vary across 
population subgroups, the two tests must be evaluated in comparable groups, 
one of which is randomized to receive the older test, and the other of which is 
randomized to receive the newer test. Or, the trial could be designed so that the 
same group receives both tests (Bossuyt et al., 2006). 
 Once a diagnostic test’s degree of accuracy is determined, that is, once it is 
found to provide reliable information about the condition in question, it must 
still be determined whether the test is worth using. Even when a diagnostic is 
accurate, this does not guarantee that it might improve patient outcomes. In 
fact, the information gained from diagnostic testing alone never has a direct 
impact on patient outcomes (although it can have positive or negative indi-
rect eﬀ ects, see, for instance, Cournoyea and Kennedy (2014))— only diagnos-
tic, treatment, and preventative  decisions made subsequent to obtaining test 
results have this kind of impact. Thus while the result (accurate or inaccurate) 
of a diagnostic test might in turn lead to a decision that has an impact on the 
patient, the information generated by the test alone does not have this power. 
Some have argued that, because of this, we ought not only to be concerned with 
determining test accuracy, but also with fi nding out whether performing a test 
ultimately improves the lives of patients. In order to determine this, we need 
to know whether a given diagnostic test is a good predictor, not only of the 
condition it is intended to diagnose, but also of treatment outcomes for this con-
dition. This information can, at least in theory, be determined via clinical trial 
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evaluation. However, just how to design a trial that reliably provides this infor-
mation is not immediately straightforward. The reason for this is that, unlike in 
the case of treatment trials,  5  in the case of trials of the impact of a diagnostic on 
patient outcomes, the evaluation is not of the test alone, but rather of the way 
in which the test guides treatment decisions that will in turn aﬀ ect the patient. 
Thus, a trial of the impact of a diagnostic test on patient outcomes is really a 
trial of the  test plus treatment (and perhaps also of cost, impact of the informa-
tion gained on the patient, etc.). In other words, while we can test the accuracy 
of one diagnostic against the accuracy of another, this, in itself, does not consti-
tute a measure of the eﬀ ect of the test on a patient. 
 Various ways have been suggested for designing trials that might yield reli-
able information about the way that diagnostic tests aﬀ ect patients. One central 
concern in designing these trials is the decision of when or where to randomize. 
Diﬀ erent quantities might be measured depending upon whether one decides 
to randomize before the decision is made to perform the test being evaluated 
(in which case it would not be possible to distinguish between treatment versus 
prognostic value of the test), versus after deciding to perform the test but prior 
to test result (in which case the test results would not need to be revealed to 
investigators or participants), versus after receiving the test result, and then ran-
domizing to treatment (for instance, only those who test positive for the condi-
tion in question, in which case investigators and trial participants would know 
the test results). In designing a test plus treatment trial in order to determine the 
eﬀ ect of a diagnostic on patient outcomes, one must fi rst decide exactly what is 
to be measured before deciding upon when to randomize the trial. 
 Diagnostics and Medical Value 
 Related to the question of the relationship between an accurate diagnostic and 
patient impact is the question of whether a diagnostic test or procedure can 
be considered valuable when it has no direct eﬀ ect on patient outcome. For 
example, one might ask whether an accurate diagnostic test for an untreatable 
disease has any medical worth.  6  This question is, at least in part, an ethical 
one, and is currently debated within the medical community. While it has been 
established that many patients do want to know what is wrong with them, even 
when a treatment for their illness or condition is not available, clinicians are 
divided over whether an accurate test for an untreatable disease should ever 
be performed (Lijmer and Bossuyt,  2009 ). To resolve this issue depends upon 
how we understand value in the medical context— for example, whether we 
believe that value is tied inextricably to patient outcomes or whether we believe 
that a test that provides knowledge is valuable even when it does not lead 
to improved patient health. Some clinicians have explicitly argued that what 
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makes a test valuable  for the patient is not its degree of correspondence with 
the truth— that is, they argue that diagnostic value is not in accurate diagnosis 
alone, but in whether that diagnosis, and subsequent treatment, can prevent the 
patient from suﬀ ering (Lijmer and Bossuyt,  2009 ). The argument is that patients 
undergoing a diagnostic test for arterial stenosis, for example, are not interested 
simply in knowing whether they have the condition, but in whether treating the 
condition might prevent a cerebrovascular episode. 
 The above issue cannot be addressed solely by an analysis of diagnostic 
accuracy. Instead, both the test’s predictive and prognostic value must be 
evaluated as well. But this is an example of a condition that  is treatable, and 
one might argue that while it is clear that in such a case the patient would 
be interested not only in a diagnosis but also in a treatment for the condition 
diagnosed, in other cases the patient’s interests might not be as clear. Consider, 
for instance, the question of whether a predictive genetic test for Huntington’s 
disease has medical worth. The test can be given to a healthy person with a 
family history of the disease and then allows the person to know whether he 
or she will develop the disease in the future. The test is very accurate; however, 
since there is no currently available treatment for Huntington’s disease, it is 
arguable whether it has any medical value. On the one hand, one might argue 
that there is value in simply knowing one’s future health fate. On the other 
hand, one could argue that since medicine is an applied practice that aims at 
improving patient health, and that, further, operates under limited resources, 
it would be a waste of both time and monetary resources to perform a test that 
will not in any way improve the health outcome of the patient. Thus, a deter-
mination of the worth of a diagnostic test is complex and depends not only on 
a determination of accuracy, but also on an estimation of the resulting value 
of performing the test, and this estimation may diﬀ er depending on how one 
analyzes value. 
 In summary, diagnostic reasoning and testing is a new area of research 
within the fi eld of philosophy of medicine, and the questions to be analyzed in 
this area are both varied and complex, in many cases containing both epistemic 
and ethical, as well as theoretical and applied, components. 
 New Directions in Philosophy of Psychiatry 
 In contrast to other areas of philosophy of medicine, questions about diagnosis 
have been of central concern in the philosophy of psychiatry. More generally, 
the relationship between philosophy of psychiatry and philosophy of medi-
cine is not as close as it perhaps should be. This state of aﬀ airs may refl ect the 
general relationship between psychiatry and the rest of medicine. There is an 
ongoing debate about whether, why, and to what extent psychiatry is distinct 
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from medicine. Some people argue that psychiatry is conceptually no diﬀ erent 
than other branches of medicine (Guze, 1992), though they may acknowledge 
that our relatively poor understanding of the pathophysiology of mental ill-
ness entails that, in practice, psychiatry faces distinct challenges. Others argue 
that psychiatry is, and will always be, importantly diﬀ erent than other areas of 
medicine (Laing,  1985 ). We believe that there could be a productive exchange of 
ideas between philosophy of psychiatry and philosophy of medicine; however, 
this discussion is beyond the scope of the chapter. Here, we will focus on ques-
tions relevant to psychiatric diagnosis. 
 Mental illness is an urgent and growing public health problem, contribut-
ing to the global burden of disease throughout the world. Vast defi ciencies in 
mental healthcare across the globe are matched by ongoing controversy over 
the nature, causes, and best treatments for disorders such as schizophrenia and 
depression. Mental disorder, its nature, its research, and its care have been of 
interest not only to philosophers who are concerned about the nature of the 
mind, and in the scientifi c explanation of complex human phenomena, such as 
mental disorders, but also to philosophers of medicine and ethicists who focus 
on issues relevant to the development of eﬀ ective and ethical treatment of men-
tal disorders (Gupta,  2014 ). 
 The goal of this section is to outline the issues concerning the scientifi c and 
ethical issues surrounding the psychiatric classifi cation systems, as they have 
become the focus of increased controversy leading to and following the pub-
lication of the fi fth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM- 5) (American Psychiatric Association,  2013 ). The DSM- 5 oﬀ ers 
the standard criteria for classifi cation of mental disorders. It is designed for 
pragmatic use across a variety of sett ings to accomplish a plethora of tasks: to 
facilitate clinical treatment; to develop educational programs about mental ill-
ness; to provide clear criteria of eligibility for various administrative and pol-
icy related purposes, including the determination of insurance coverage and 
disability aid; and to further scientifi c research into mental disorder etiology, 
psychopharmacology, and forensics. One core concern that stems from the 
multiplicity of the purposes assigned to the DSM- 5 is its questionable capac-
ity in fully fulfi lling these roles. This concern, which is gett ing stronger fol-
lowing the publication of the DSM- 5, focuses on its usefulness in the clinical 
context during the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders, and utility for 
advancing research on the etiology of mental disorders. With respect to clinical 
use, we highlight the problems associated with its symptom- based approach to 
classifying mental disorders. For instance, this feature has led to the removal of 
the bereavement exclusion criterion from the major depression category, allow-
ing complicated grief to be diagnosed as depression on the grounds that grief 
related distress and depression are manifest through the same symptoms. We 
then turn to research related limitations of the DSM- 5. Here we also review 
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RDoC, the alternative schema for psychiatric research created by the NIMH, as 
an alternative to the DSM- 5 for research purposes. 
 A core concern about the fi tness of the DSM- 5 for clinical purposes is the 
descriptive approach to mental disorder classifi cations, in which mental disor-
ders are individuated through symptoms and signs, as opposed to focusing on 
the individual’s experience as a complex and multidimensional person (Sadler, 
 2005 ; Radden,  2009 ; Tekin, 2015; Tekin and Mosko,  2015 ). The symptom- based 
classifi cation of mental disorders was adopted in the DSM- III (1980) and guided 
both the DSM- IV (1994) and the recently published DSM- 5 (2013). The devel-
opment of this approach was an expression of psychiatry’s move toward an 
evidence- based scientifi c framework, away from the etiological approaches of 
the DSM- I (1952) and the DSM- II (1968). These earlier approaches relied on 
empirically undefended theoretical assumptions about the workings of the 
mind, rather than outwardly observable disease correlates. Mental disorders, 
also called “reactions” in these manuals, were represented in relation to the 
causal factors thought to underlie them (American Psychiatric Association, 
 1952 ). These causal factors were described in the framework of psychoanaly-
sis and taken either to be a dysfunction in the brain or a general diﬃ  culty in 
adaptation to environmental stressors due to unresolved sexual confl icts of 
childhood. 
 In the DSM- III, a descriptive approach replaced this framework because 
clusters of symptoms and signs, by virtue of their observability and measura-
bility, were thought to facilitate objective scientifi c research and reliable clinical 
diagnosis. A scientifi cally valid category of mental disorder requires external 
validators, such as symptoms and signs, not simply theories (Robins and Guze, 
 1970 ). Thus, symptom and sign clusters were resourceful constructs for scien-
tists whose goal was to investigate bett er the neurological and genetic under-
pinnings of mental illness. The proponents of the descriptive approach have 
fi rst come up with a broad list of signs and symptoms individuating mental 
disorders, knowing that these are only abstractions and that they do not cap-
ture the full complexity of mental disorders. The hope was that as psychiatry 
progressed symptoms and signs would be bett er delineated and more refi ned 
categories might be developed. However, this did not happen; rather the char-
acterization of mental disorders as symptom clusters remained. The categories 
have departed further from the complex and real experiences of individuals 
with mental disorders. 
 One signifi cant disadvantage of operationalizing a symptom- based approach 
is that the symptom clusters fail to represent certain complexities involved in 
mental disorder, which are neither immediately observable nor readily measur-
able. In a mental disorder experience, the individual’s relationship with herself, 
her physical environment, and her social environment is strained or severed, 
adding many layers of complexities to mental disorders. These include the 
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developmental trajectory of mental disorder in the individual from childhood to 
adulthood; the individual’s particular life history; interpersonal relationships; 
biological and environmental risk factors; gender, race, and socioeconomic sta-
tus; the fi rst- person- specifi c dimension of the symptoms, such as what the indi-
vidual hears when she hears voices; and the meaning the individual ascribes to 
these elements of life in her sociocultural context. DSM- 5 categories, by virtue 
of highlighting symptoms, abstract (or bracket) the self- related and context- 
specifi c aspects with mental disorders. By saying litt le about how the disor-
der experience is integrated into the patient’s life, the categories are simply a 
“repertoire of behavior” (Radden,  2009 ). Such neglect of the complexity of the 
experiences of those with mental disorders has jeopardized the DSM- 5’s project 
as an eﬀ ective tool for clinical diagnosis and treatment. 
 These worries are escalated with the DSM- 5’s removal of the bereavement 
exclusion criterion from the depression category, which allows an individual 
experiencing complicated grief to be diagnosed as having depression. The argu-
ment for this change is as follows: since there are signifi cant overlaps between 
symptoms and signs of depression and the experiences of those experiencing 
complicated grief, and science, there is no scientifi c evidence for characteriz-
ing bereavement related distress and depression as distinct conditions; hence, 
whatever treatment helps the latt er might also help the former (Zisook and 
Kendler,  2007 ; Zisook et al.,  2001 ). Those arguing against the change insist that 
the cited evidence base is slim and that there are signifi cant diﬀ erences between 
complicated grief and depression (Horwitz  and Wakefi eld, 2007; Wakefi eld and 
First,  2012 ; Kleinman,  2012 ; Frances, 2013; Wakefi eld,  2015 ). Concerns have also 
been raised about the clinical eﬃ  cacy of this change, with the argument that 
folding complicated grief into depression does not facilitate the development 
of psychotherapeutic approaches to address complicated grief clinically (Tekin, 
 2015 ; Tekin and Mosko,  2015 ). 
 The DSM- 5 has also not satisfi ed those interested in developing a psychiatric 
taxonomy system that advances research in psychiatry. Just before the pub-
lication of the DSM- 5 in 2013, the NIMH abandoned the DSM- 5 for research 
purposes (Insel, 2013). The argument put forward was that the DSM- 5 catego-
ries are not suﬃ  cient for research purposes because they lack validity, and that 
a diagnostic system aiming to scrutinize mental illness should more directly 
refl ect modern neuroscience, as “mental illness will be best understood as dis-
orders of brain structure and function that implicate specifi c domains of cogni-
tion, emotion, and behavior” (Insel, 2013). 
 As an alternative to the DSM- 5, the NIMH announced the RDoC project, 
which att empts to create a new conceptual framework to describe psychiatric 
research. RDoC brings together the resources provided by various basic sci-
ences, including genetics and neuroscience. It lays out a model of basic psy-
chological capacities that are believed to uncover the biological mechanisms 
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underlying psychopathology. Instead of organizing psychopathology into 
DSM- 5 categories like schizophrenia and major depressive disorder, the RDoC 
explicates psychopathology in terms of basic psychological processes (e.g., 
declarative memory, perception) and their underlying biological mechanisms. 
 Insel ( 2013 ) provides three fundamental tenets of the RDoC. First, RDoC is a 
diagnostic approach based on biology, not on observable signs and symptoms. 
Second, it takes mental disorders to be biological disorders involving brain cir-
cuitry that implicate the specifi c domains of cognition, emotion, or behavior. It 
is expected that scientists can bett er identify and investigate the circuits impli-
cated in mental illness as neuroscience and genetics advance. Third, the map-
ping of the cognitive, circuit, and genetic aspects of mental disorders can yield 
new and bett er targets for treatment. 
 The success of RDoC as a useful guide for research remains to be deter-
mined, as the NIMH task force works to complete the project. Skeptics question 
the ability of RDoC to rescue psychiatry from its crisis, suggesting that it would 
fail to increase validity as it is grounded on assumptions about how the brain 
works rather than on actual scientifi c facts about the complex mechanisms by 
which the brain operates (Hoﬀ man and Zachar, in press). Some critics have 
suggested that the primacy of neuroscientifi c and genetic research in psycho-
pathology continues an unfortunate trend that ignores the crucial role of the 
phenomenology of mental illness, and this may have negative implications for 
treatment (Graham and Flanagan,  2013 ). Finally, some critics worry that the 
developers of the RDoC are making the same mistake as those who were instru-
mental in developing the symptom- based criteria for mental disorders. As dis-
cussed earlier, the proponents of the descriptive approach characterized mental 
disorders through a list of signs and symptoms, knowing that these are only 
abstractions and that they do not capture the full complexity of mental disor-
ders. However, as the DSM project evolved, they dropped the recognition that 
such characterizations are abstractions, leaving the categories of mental disor-
ders further away from the true complexities of mental disorders. Similarly, the 
worry is that the RDoC’s proposed molecular and neurobiological mental dis-
order parameters, which are expected to be bett er identifi ed and investigated 
as neuroscience and genetics develop, may be uncritically accepted as the true 
targets of research (Bluhm, in press), leading to disorientation in the fi eld of 
psychiatric research. 
 Objectivity and Medical Research 
 A fi nal area that we want to highlight as an important new direction in philoso-
phy of medicine is that of the objectivity of medical research. We noted earlier 
that philosophy of medicine is beginning to take account of the relationship 
9781474233002_txt.indd   358 7/12/2016   5:52:25 PM
New Directions in Philosophy of Medicine
359
359
between medical research and the broader social context within which it occurs. 
The social context of medical research, in part, helps to constitute the objectivity 
of medical research and, in part, serves to threaten that very objectivity. 
 As a discipline whose results often bear direct social relevance, medical 
research att racts considerable interest among the general public. For instance, 
58 percent of Americans say they are interested in new medical discoveries 
(National Science Foundation, 2014) and, according to the Welcome trust moni-
tor report (2013), 75 percent of adults in the United Kingdom reported being 
curious about medical research. Media reports on new cures, clinical guide-
lines, and possible health threats may infl uence the behavior of the members of 
the public. Scandals such as the ones related to the link between the painkiller 
Vioxx and cardiovascular events (Biddle,  2007 ) and selective serotonin reup-
take inhibitors and suicidal ideation (Healy,  2012 ) have raised doubts about the 
trustworthiness of medical research and the integrity of scientists working in 
the fi eld. Similarly, the recent outbreaks of vaccine- preventable diseases— such 
as measles, whooping cough, and polio— have been associated with the rise 
of the antivaccine movement and the distrust of established medical expertise 
(Poland and Jacobson,  2011 ). The public’s reactions to these events show that 
one of the most important current challenges for the community of medical 
scientists is securing the public’s trust in its research. One of the conditions for 
maintaining trust in science is that research is conducted in a way that is thought 
to be objective. Thus, searching for the means that best support objectivity is a 
central assignment for medical scientists and philosophers of medicine. 
 Commercial interests have been associated with many of the scandals 
that have threatened the apparent trustworthiness of medical science, since 
industry- funded drug trials report favorable results for company products 
when compared to trials funded by independent agencies (Lundh et al.,  2012 ). 
Furthermore, reports of secrecy and dubious practices in medical research, par-
ticularly in the development of new drugs, have started to emerge (Sismondo, 
2008). Biomedical research is a highly commercialized fi eld. In 2012, 58 percent 
of research in the United States was funded by private sources (Moses et al., 
 2015 ). Consequently, critics have argued that the objectivity of the discipline is 
being compromised. Yet, it is not self- evident what actually is called for when 
objectivity of research is demanded. 
 Traditionally the objectivity of research has been associated with the integ-
rity of individual scientists: objectivity is a trait that researchers need to cul-
tivate in themselves.  7  According to this understanding, researchers should 
be on guard against their own biases and withdraw from assignments that 
might involve confl icts of interests that could undermine their impartiality 
(Shamoo and Resnik,  2009 ). However, studies on implicit biases have shown 
that individuals are not very good at recognizing their own biases (Uhlman 
and Cohen,  2007 ). Furthermore, even when individuals do their best not to let 
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their preferences infl uence their reasoning, human actions tend to be aﬀ ected 
by extraneous factors. For example, even small gifts can have an impact on the 
prescribing practices of physicians (Katz  et al., 2003). Thus, it seems that rely-
ing on individuals’ integrity is not enough to ensure that research results are 
unbiased. Because of this, when the grounds for conducting objective medical 
research are investigated, the perspective has to be shifted from evaluating the 
att itudes of individuals to examining practices and methods that would best 
ensure unbiased outcomes. 
 Which methods best promote the objectivity of research have been a debated 
issue in philosophy of science. The controversies are partly rooted in the intrin-
sic complexity of the concept of objectivity. As recent historical and philo-
sophical analyses have suggested, objectivity is a multifaceted concept, and its 
diﬀ erent meanings can be used for promoting diverse practices. For example, 
Porter (1995) and Daston and Galison ( 2010 ) have traced the transformations of 
the concept and its diﬀ erent meanings through several centuries. According to 
these scholars, diﬀ erent virtues have been att ached to objectivity. Daston and 
Galison ( 2010 ), for example, describe how the ideal of mechanical objectivity 
encouraged atlas makers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to 
fi nd ways of depicting nature without the interference of human judgment and 
interpretation, even if it happened at the expense of describing the details of the 
object of interest. They detail how bacterial cultures and other objects could be 
illustrated using photography in a way that apparently had not been aﬀ ected 
by subjective interpretations, but earlier methods of depicting nature, such 
as the drawings of expert artists, were bett er at portraying spatial depth and 
color. Thus, the photographs had less diagnostic utility than drawings, despite 
the fact that the latt er were always infl uenced by the subjectivity of the artists. 
Similarly, Porter (1995) shows how in the discipline of accounting, portraying 
the object of interest in a quantifi ed form has been used as a means of guarding 
the line of business from outsiders’ accusations of corruption. What is common 
in these descriptions of the use of the term “objectivity” is that pursuing certain 
practices that are labeled objective or that ensure objectivity is a way of trying 
to build trust— both between the members of the communities following these 
practices and among outsiders. 
 Achieving objectivity is thought to require removing detrimental subjectiv-
ity, and the biases associated with it, from the process, and thereby improv-
ing the trustworthiness of results (cf. Daston and Galison,  2010 , pp. 373– 74). 
According to Douglas (2004, p. 454), the “implicit call to trust” is still common 
in the diverse ways in which the term “objective” is used today. She has speci-
fi ed eight diﬀ erent senses of objectivity that can be used to refer to outcomes 
of diﬀ erent kinds of processes. Due to the complexity of the term, it is possible 
to praise a method for producing objective results or denounce it as biased— 
depending on which of the senses of objectivity is chosen as the ideal to follow. 
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Because of the rhetorical force behind stating something to be objective, these 
choices can infl uence methodologies and have bearings on philosophical dis-
cussions concerning medical research. 
 Douglas’s analysis can be used to evaluate the discussions concerning the 
objectivity of medical research as it elucidates the fact that not all senses of 
objectivity are applicable in every context. For example, one way of trying to 
constrain subjectivity and avoid biased results is to aim at making individual 
judgments redundant by establishing guidelines and procedures that give 
detailed instructions on how to carry out research. Douglas (2004, pp. 461– 62) 
calls this ideal “procedural objectivity.” This understanding of objectivity has 
led to discussions over the use of meta- analyses in amalgamating evidence. 
Stegenga ( 2011 ) has argued that meta- analysis falls short of being the platinum 
standard of evidence: despite the communally accepted guidelines, performing 
a meta- analysis necessarily involves numerous judgments on the analyst’s part, 
which, in turn, opens the door for individual biases and subjective preferences 
and, thus, mitigates the method’s objectivity. Stegenga’s analysis demonstrates 
why following the ideal of disposing of the need for individual judgments fails 
in a context where the reliability of medical knowledge is sought: it is practi-
cally impossible. 
 In addition, focusing on the way in which studies and analyses are con-
ducted, that is, on the “internal” processes of scientifi c inquiry, overlooks an 
important area that infl uences science, namely, the impact an institutional 
context of research has on knowledge production. For example, Young et al. 
( 2008 ) worry that medical science may be biased by the current publication 
practices, which encourage researchers to pursue projects that are likely to be 
accepted by the most prestigious journals. Publication bias— studies showing 
positive results are published more often than studies with negative results— 
is perhaps the most signifi cant bias aﬀ ecting medical publishing, which sys-
tematically biases the literature (Godlee and Dickersin,  2003 ). Brown (2010), in 
turn, has argued that the funding structure in the fi eld of biomedicine, that is, 
the prevalence of industry funding and the pressure to produce commercially 
applicable results, is creating lacunae in published literature. If the available 
funding guides research toward searching for only certain types of explana-
tions for phenomena and the interests that motivate planning research in this 
way are not in line with generally accepted goals of research, then it might 
be the case that the outcomes of research regarded in their entirety have been 
biased. In other words, medical research is not objective. For instance, if fund-
ing is available only for those studies on mental illnesses that may produce 
patentable outcomes, important features of the phenomena may be left unstud-
ied (Musschenga et al.,  2010 ). 
 According to critics who urge taking notice of practices related to the alloca-
tion of funding and dissemination of results, focusing on individual studies and 
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assessing only their internal quality leaves invisible certain features of research 
activities that may systematically bias scientifi c knowledge. In the context of 
medical research, this is particularly worrisome. According to the principles 
of EBM, the results of meta- analyses and other systematic reviews trump indi-
vidual studies, and treatment guidelines are usually based on amalgamated 
evidence (Howick, 2011b). Because of this, the objectivity of medical research 
should be evaluated by using a concept of objectivity that accommodates the 
possibility of systematic biases that are caused by factors not belonging to the 
internal stages of research. 
 According to a traditional understanding, practices that take place in the 
context of discovery, that is, when research questions and hypotheses are 
developed, do not have an infl uence on the objectivity of knowledge produc-
tion because through rigorous testing any possible biases can be removed in the 
so- called context of justifi cation. In the light of recent empirical studies on the 
pharmaceutical industry (Sismondo, 2008) and philosophical analyses (Brown, 
2010), however, this assumption should be questioned. Contrary to the tradi-
tional understanding of the distinction between the contexts of discovery and 
justifi cation, testing of claims may not weed out all biases. The objectivity and 
trustworthiness of medical research can be severely compromised because of 
publication bias or problematic practices that occur in the phases of the alloca-
tion of resources, which fall on the discovery side of the discovery- justifi cation 
distinction. If the way of framing research questions and projects results in a 
skewed understanding of the object of interest, it is possible to talk about the 
violation of objectivity (Brown, 2010). Consequently, the objectivity of medical 
research has to be examined from a perspective that takes notice of a wider 
spectrum of practices and factors than is traditionally considered. 
 A viable candidate for a new perspective on the aforementioned issues 
comes from social epistemology. Social epistemological theories have high-
lighted the importance that the institutional context of inquiry has for the 
reliability of produced information. For example, Longino ( 1990 ,  2002 ) has 
argued that the objectivity of research is dependent on the institutional and 
social context in which inquiry takes place and because of this, instead of 
exclusively evaluating individual scientists or single studies, those who are 
interested in addressing biases should pay att ention to the organizational 
structure of science. Likewise, Biddle ( 2007 ) has argued that epistemic 
problems of biomedical research should be addressed with institutional 
arrangements. 
 In sum, diﬀ erent understandings of objectivity direct our att ention to assess-
ing diverse features of scientifi c practice. In the light of recent analyses that 
have disclosed problematic practices related to current biomedical research, 
it seems that those ideals of objectivity that are applicable for assessing indi-
vidual scientists or particular methods for testing hypotheses are insuﬃ  cient 
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for capturing which factors may bias the eventual results. Because of this, it is 
essential to develop analyses of objectivity further that examine how conditions 
for this virtue are constituted at the level of research communities. 
 Conclusion 
 Philosophy of medicine has developed greatly over the past decade or so, with 
a new focus on epistemological questions (and their relationship with ethical 
questions). This chapter has identifi ed several areas in which new and inter-
esting philosophical questions are being addressed, and it has described how 
this research is beginning to build on and expand philosophical research on 
medicine, medical research, and the social context in which these activities are 
conducted. 
 Notes 
 1.  See also  chapter 10 of this volume for a discussion of gender medicine. 
 2.  Here we discuss RDoC further, placing it in the larger context of discussions in phi-
losophy of psychiatry. We focus only on RDoC as an att empt to develop ways of 
categorizing patients, which are intended to result in improved care. 
 3.  See, for example, Bossuyt et al. ( 2000 ,  2006 ) ; and Ferrante di Rufano et al. (2012). 
 4.  As with the debate regarding the epistemic merits of RCTs with respect to assessing 
the eﬃ  cacy of therapeutic interventions, the requirement that comparative accuracy 
of diagnostic tests be assessed with RCTs is debatable— though we do not articulate 
the debate here. 
 5.  RCTs of therapeutic treatments are subject to well- known epistemic and ethical prob-
lems of their own. However, as these issues have been elsewhere addressed in the 
philosophy of medicine literature, we will not discuss them here. 
 6.  In such cases, a test might have a negative eﬀ ect on patient outcomes, perhaps due to 
the intervention of the test, the cost, the anxiety from information gained, and so on. 
On the other hand, it might have a positive eﬀ ect. Some studies (Lijmer and Bossuyt, 
 2009 , for example) show that patients want to know what is wrong with them even 
when there isn’t the possibility of doing anything about it. 
 7.  See, for example, Smith ( 2004 ) for a defense of a view according to which the objectiv-
ity of science can be reduced to individuals. 
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